A b s tra c t P sy c h o a n a ly sis, science fiction a n d c y b o rg ia n ism Central to this paper is the understanding that much o f crucial importance to psychoanalytic thought rests on a conception o f the subject as inseparable from a history o f the body a history in turn inseparable from the centraI tenets o f Oedipus, in its turn a concept which originates in and is illustrated by literature. The pa p er will suggest that when recent cultural theorists, drawing on the implications o f cybernetics and infoculture theory, contest the psychoanalytic notion o f the subject, it is not surprising that they do so in terms o f the possibility o f an alternative body -a hybrid form o f subjectivity between human and machine. Nor, the pap er suggests, is it surprising that it should be science fiction, a genre with a long-standing concern with the possibility o f such an amalgam, which supplies the key evidence fo r a post-oedipal theory o f this "cyb o rg " subject. The p a p er concludes by speculating on the productivity o f the conjunction between literature and thinking about the body, inasmuch as this conjunction attempts to establish a new anthropology o f the self.
B a lla rd 's Crash
D o w e see, in the car crash, a sinister po rten t o f a n ightm are m arriage betw een sex and technology? W ill m o d em technology provide us w ith hitherto u n d re am ed -o f m eans for tapping o u r ow n p sychopathologies? Is this h arnessing o f our innate perversity conceivably o f b e n efit to us? Is there sotne deviant logic unfolding m ore pow erful than that pro v id ed by reason? (B allard, 1990[1974]:9) to the psychological impact o f technology, one which, more than twenty years on from Ballard's w ords, seems perhaps less necessary.
Ballard's science fictional writing has largely been concerned with the tangentially science fictional possibilities o f what he, along with many o f the socalled "N ew W ave" science fiction writers (John Brunner, Brian Aldiss and M ichael M oorcock, for example), calls "inner space"; that is, a psychologicallyinflected form o f SF in which the sole interest is the effect on the human psyche o f cultural or technological extremity. Ballard, a chief proponent o f this variant o f SF, is concerned with what is essentially a change in the relation o f the subject to its own psychical forces, brought about by changes in the interaction o f the subject with technology. His focus on the pathological consequences and possibilities o f the human/technology interface plays itself out in the extra ordinarily plausible fiction o f C rash , a novel which contains few o f the generic m arkers usually associated with SF, except for a central concern with technology.
The novel details the growing obsession o f its narrator, "Ballard", with the erotic possibilities o f car crashes; particularly the conjunction o f the sexuality o f human bodies with the functional and decorative geometry o f automobile design. The scars and w eals produced on the bodies o f crash victims by the design details o f car interiors, such as gearstick mountings and m anufacturer's steering wheel medallions, become in the narrator's mind the eroticized stigmata o f a new form o f human sexuality. These obsessions find their embodiment in the character o f the "hoodlum scientist" Vaughan, who has turned the pursuit o f the eroticized crash into a deviant lifestyle; his ultimate goal is to kill him self in a head-on collision betw een his own car (a Lincoln Continental -a replica o f the car in which John F. K ennedy w as assassinated) and the limousine containing the actress Elizabeth Taylor. V aughan's obsessively reiterated rehearsing o f this ultimate crash, photographing, filming and planning, as well as the " content" o f the crash itself, serve as the nexus o f the novel's central concerns with sexuality, psychology and the quintessentially twentieth century technologies o f the automobile and the mass media.
Pivotal to the pornographic and intellectual impact o f the novel is its revising o f the body's erotic possibilities as those are controlled, destroyed and reshaped by automotive technology. The narrator becom es involved with a woman in V aughan's entourage o f acolytes who has been crippled by a crash and w ears a heavy spinal brace. The deep w eals on her thighs created by the straps o f the brace becom e for him a new sexual organ, an alternative orifice m ade erotic by its origin in the high-impact conjunction with the car. As he ejaculates into these fleshly channels a reconfigured set o f erotic possibilities opens up to him: I dream ed o f o ther accidents that m ight enlarge this repertory o f orifices, relating them to m ore elem ents o f the auto m o b ile's engineering, to the ever m ore com plex technologies o f the future. W hat w ounds w ould create the sexual p o ssibilities o f the invisible technologies o f th erm o n u clear reaction cham bers, w hite-tiled control room s, the m ysterious scenarios o f com puter circuitry? ... 1 visualized ... the w ounds upon w hich erotic fantasies m ight be erected, the extraordinary sexual acts celebrating the possib ilities o f unim agined technologies. In these fantasies I w as able at last to visualize those deaths and injuries I had alw ays feared. I visualized m y w ife injured in a h igh-im p act collision, her m outh and face destroyed, and a new and exciting orifice opened in her perineum by the splintering steering colum n, neith er vagina n o r rectum , an orifice w e could dress w ith all o u r deepest affections ... I visualized the body o f m y ow n m other, at various stages o f her life, injured in a succession o f accidents, fitted w ith orifices o f evergreater abstraction and ingenuity, so that m y incest w ith h e r m ight becom e m ore and m ore cerebral, allow ing m e to com e to term s at last w ith her em braces and postures (B allard, 1990[ 1974] : 138).
This lengthy passage is necessary both to give a sense o f the extraordinary technologization o f language Ballard achieves in the novel and to indicate, here densely and concisely expressed, the explicit connection betw een sexuality and technology which both he and his fictional nam esake wish to explore.
Stylistically the usual repertoire o f the pom ographer is absent, replaced by a clinical detachment which, when used to articulate such manifestly perverse content, produces a profoundly alienating reading experience. That content, particularly o f this passage but o f the work as a whole, is indeed perverse, and in the specific psychoanalytic sense o f that term. That is, we are presented here with the possibility o f the body having an alternately-zoned sexuality, with libidinal investment no longer centred on the genitals. It is clear too that the alternative sexualizing o f the body is achieved through an exponentially increasing imbrication o f sexuality and technology, beginning with the automobile, which acts almost as a template, and ending with "the mysterious scenarios o f com puter circuitry" . The technology o f the automobile is the creator o f a radically altered sexual body, one which, in this passage, is tied to a specific fantasy structure. Even non-Freudians would recognise the roots o f this structure in aggressivity and incest, two o f the fundamentally inassimilable underpinnings o f the psychic apparatus which modern civilization has had to renounce in order to establish itself.
In Ballard the narrator's fantasy, the physical and sexual identities o f his wife are obliterated by the crash, by the automobile -her face and mouth are destroyed, and the other sexual zones o f her body are bypassed in favour o f the technologically-created perineal orifice. The fantasy recreation o f his wife as a I.ileralor 17(2) Aug. 1996:105-116 post-crash object, however, turns out to be simply the prelude to his desire to understand his m other's "em braces and postures", an abstract cerebration, or even perverse working-through, o f his incestuous desire for his mother.
C yborgianism

Cyborg anxiety
The foregoing seems a neat enough analysis, but such a psychoanalytic reading o f the novel's content underspecifies the larger questions raised concerning the imbrication o f bodies and technologies. In what follows I undertake a critical review o f some o f the ways in which these questions are investigated in contemporary cultural theory, and conclude by counterposing to these technophilic theoretical narratives some considerations about the bodytechnology nexus seen from the viewpoint o f psychoanalytic theory. Assumed throughout the essay and made explicit in its concluding rem arks is the conviction that a psychoanalytic reading brings to the understanding o f the body-technology nexus a dimension unavailable to other forms o f cultural anthropology; that is, an on to logica l reading o f the effect o f technology on sexuality and the unconscious, a reading which SF is well placed to facilitate. In this context the content o f particular texts such as Ballard's, though they are important and elegant aesthetic demonstrations o f the body-technology nexus, are less important for this argument than the general ontological questions they raise: the concern is not to analyse the specific ways in which technology impinges on human identity (as in the perverse sexuality o f the Ballard passage analysed above), but to draw conclusions about the conditions o f that identity itself and w hether or not it is fundamentally affected by the apparent encroachm ents o f contem porary technologies. Psychoanalysis is thus used m etapsychologically and as a methodology, not to seek to produce psychoanalytic readings or results.
The body o f recent theory I have mentioned, which I will call cyborgianism by virtue o f its pivotal interest in human/machine hybridity, has tw o theoretical fields in common with Ballard's characters' fantasies in C rash . The first, and pre dominant one, is the focus on bodily change through technology. This ranges from actual prosthetics, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and so on, to the possibility o f an actual cybernetic organism indistinguishable in any obvious way from a human being. The latter possibility is almost entirely restricted to (science) fictional texts. The second, imbricated field is a theorising o f changes in the form o f culture itself due to technology. These w ould refer to the in creasing miniaturization and accessibility o f communications technology from the walkman to the satellite dish, and the consequent changes in patterns o f human interaction (through com puter networks, for example).
Two m etaphors might be employed as a kind o f shorthand for the theoretical fields o f cyborgianism. The first, o f course, is that o f the cyborg itself, the hybrid form o f human and machine, a cybernetic organism.
In SF, the cyborg is the culmination o f a thematic lineage at least as old as the genre -that o f the robot. The cyborg thus presents the same set o f pre occupations, usually dystopian in upshot, about w hat happens when machines become difficult to distinguish from human beings. The history o f the theme, dated (contemporaneously with w hat is often regarded as the beginning o f SF itself) from M ary Shelley's F rankenstein by authorities like Aldiss and Wingrove (1988) , reveals a consistent wish to exert control over an artificially produced human simulacrum, whose simulated or manufactured status seems to dramatise the danger o f technology -a product o f culture -encroaching too far on human identity -itself a precarious balance between nature and culture. Interestingly, and perhaps inevitably, control over the machine in SF usually takes distinctly oedipal forms. This is most clearly seen in Isaac A sim ov's famous "Three Laws o f R obotics", formulated with the help o f editor John Campbell at the beginning o f the 1940s. It is now perhaps unnecessary to rehearse them, but the laws are as follows: no robot may allow a human being to come to harm; a robot must obey orders given by human beings, except where such orders conflict with the first law; and a robot must protect its own existence as long as this does not conflict with the first and second laws. The laws indicate that the servility o f the human simulacra to their human creators must be ensured, so it is interesting too that most o f SF's robot narratives, not only A sim ov's, are enabled by the contingent breakdown o f robot programming, so that the situation and the narrative can be resolved by the recuperation o f human superiority.
The cultural crisis arising from the realisation that a human/machine hybrid might supercede the human itself has been dubbed "cyborg anxiety" :
... the cyborg has stood for the radical anxiety o f hum an consciousness about its ow n em bodim ent at the m om ent that em bodim ent appears m ost fully contingent. C yborg anxiety has stood for a panic o scillation betw een the 'hu m a n ' elem ent (associated w ith affections, eros, error, innovations, pro jects begun in the face o f m ortality) and the 'm ac h in e ' elem ent (the desire fo r long life, health, physical im perm eability ..., dependability, and hence the ab ility to fulfil prom ises over a long term ) (C sicsery-R onay, 1991:395.)
Rather than only anxiety about identity, however, it should be noted that there are also important differences in the w ays in which cyborg identity has been gendered by SF, as Specifically, I will argue that the prospect o f the possible superceding o f human identity by machinic or cyborgian identity has produced two conflicting views.
On the one hand SF sees the possibility as essentially dystopian, one w hich SF writers and filmmakers have responded to (in accordance, perhaps, with an oedipal imperative in the structure o f narrative itself) by a reassertion o f some measure o f intrinsic human worth. The definitive statement o f this essentially ambiguous attitude to technology is A sim ov's laws, but it has proved to have a stubborn and continuing existence. A neat contemporary example is the payoff line to James Cam eron's 1991 cyborg epic, T erm in ator 2 -Ju dgm en t D a y. In the film, Arnold Schw arzenegger reprises his somewhat typecast 1984 role as a killer cyborg from the future, but this time he has been reprogram m ed to protect the future leader o f the human resistance to machine rule, John Connor, and Connor's mother Sarah. During the course o f the cyborg's interactions with these humans, but particularly the young John Connor, it becom es more humanly responsive and less robotic, prompting Sarah Connor to muse that the cyborg would make the perfect father for her son, since it would always be there to protect him.
The pseudo-oedipal structure o f the human/cyborg interaction is clear here, and what makes it false is a lack o f productive conflict betw een the boy and the cyborg. The boy is father to the cyborgian man, since he is chiefly responsible for the "humanizing" o f the robotic killer, but the reverse could not be true, since John Connor has nothing to fear and reject in the cyborg. By the end o f the film, when the cyborg "chooses" to sacrifice itself so that the future development o f its technology and a consequent human holocaust might be prevented, Sarah Connor muses that "if a machine -a term inator -could leam the value o f human life, maybe we can too" . The line is a tim e-honoured sentiment in SF narrative, and is o f course fundamentally conservative o f the ontological status o f humanity in the face o f the challenge that technology brings in the figure o f the cyborg. W e might recall Ballard's note o f caution about approaching the "brutal, erotic realm that beckons to us from the margins o f the technological landscape" to conclude that perhaps the predominant note in SF visions o f the human/machine interface is gloomy, dystopian and technophobically cautionary.
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Cyborg culture
Yet not all cyborg theorists would concur. The conflicting response to the one just outlined is that the era o f the cyborg, our anxiety about the prospect notwithstanding, is upon us, and that it presents us with exciting and potentially liberatory, or at least politically and culturally radical, avenues. Such theorists add to the m etaphor o f the cyborg body that o f a cyborg culture, the second o f the two theoretical fields 1 mentioned earlier. Its metaphor is c y b e rsp a c e , the term coined by cyberpunk SF writer William Gibson to describe the realm where information resides in its basic electronic state.
One o f the most radical polemicists for the cyborgian culture in cyberspace rendered possible by the information age is Jean Baudrillard (1983:129): ... this body, our body, often appears sim ply superfluous, b asically useless in its extension, in the m ultiplicity o f its organs, its tissues and functions, since today everything is concentrated in the brain and in genetic codes, w hich alone sum up the operational definition o f being. T he countryside, the im m ense geographic countryside, seem s to be a d eserted body w hose ex p an se and dim ensions appear arbitrary, ... as soon as all events are e pitom ised in the tow ns, them selves underg oing reduction to a few m in iatu rized highlights. A nd tim e: w hat can be said a bout this im m ense free tim e w e are left w ith ... as soon as the instantaneity o f com m unication has m iniaturized o u r exchanges into a succession o f instants?
Baudrillard's vision o f the information age is thus one o f disembodiment, both in terms o f the subject and its "real" experience in space and time.
The opening assertions o f this passage, that the body is "basically useless in its extension", is a contemporary radicalizing o f the classic view o f technology expressed by Freud in C ivilization a n d Its D iscon ten ts that technology is a functional extension o f human physicality, an ambivalent way o f "perfecting the organs", that, finally, m an has ... becom e a kind o f prosthetic God. W hen he puts on all his a uxiliary organs he is truly m agnificent, but those organs have not grow n o nto him and they still give him m uch trouble at tim es (Freud, 1985:279-280 ).
Baudrillard's argument is thus that, rather than being tools in the service o f the body, contemporary technologies augment the space o f the body itself, so that the body and the technology become indistinguishable. For Baudrillard -and this is an argument which m akes him influential on the "cyberpunk" literary subgenre in 80s SF -this represents the obsolescence o f physical agency and its replacement by technological consciousness. The media o f our culture have indeed become indistinguishable from their m essages, and our subjectivity loses the necessity for origin stories because o f its instantaneous and internalised electronic mediation.
Thus the subject in contemporary technoculture represents Baudrillard's simulacrum in hyperreality. That subject has w hat Scott Bukatman (1993) , recently term ed a "terminal identity" in a pun on the apocalyptic subject experiencing through the screen o f com puter terminal and TV. Baudrillard (1983:130) N o m ore hysteria, no m ore p rojective paranoia, ... but this state o f terro r pro p er to the schizophrenic: too g reat a proxim ity o f everything, the unclean prom iscuity o f everything w hich touches, invests and p enetrates w ith o u t resistan ce, w ith no halo o f private protection, not even his ow n body, to pro tect him anym ore (132).
The mapping here o f hysteric-paranoic-schizophrenic onto the structural topo graphy o f theatre-organization-infonnation, although Badrillard does not acknowledge it, bears a strong resemblance to the thesis o f Deleuze and G uattari's The A n ti-O edipu s: C a pitalism a n d S ch izoph ren ia (1984) , which calls for a reconstruing o f pathology in order to move beyond the oppressive logic o f Oedipus.
W here their argument most nearly touches technological issues in the rather narrow sense in which I have been discussing them is in their two famous revisions o f the body in the discourses o f psychoanalysis as a "desiring-m achine" and as a "Body without O rgans" (BwO). What both o f these polemically phantasm atic images have in common is a repudiation o f Oedipus and zoned sexuality. If the body can be a machine in a circuit o f "desiring-production" it escapes the enculturated logic o f identification, desire and lack inscribed in the procedures o f oedipalization.
Similarly, the BwO is a metaphor, drawn from more or less pathological discourses such as A rtaud's, w hose force lies in its presumption o f a continually shifting and dispersed cathexis in the body. In this at least the BwO recalls the technological creation o f new bodily ontices in C rash , and allies itself specifically with other aestheticizations o f pathology in w riters like William Burroughs, and , o f course, SF writers like Pynclion and Ballard.
One further theorist o f cyborgianism needs to be considered, since her work is perhaps most representative o f contemporary thought on cyborg culture. This is Donna Haraway, whose 1985 (1990) essay A M an ifesto f o r C yb o rg s has been very influential. Her central contention (Haraway, 1990:192 ) is as follows:
... the cyborg is ... the aw ful apocalyptic telos o f the W e st's escalating dom ination o f abstract individuation, an ultim ate se lf untied at last from all dependency, a m an in space. A n origin story in the W estern hum anist sense depends on the m yth o f original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic m other from w hom all hum ans m ust separate, the task o f individual developm ent and history, the tw in p o ten t m yths inscribed m ost pow erfu lly for us in psychoanalysis and M arxism ... T he cyborg skips the step o f original unity, o f identification w ith N ature in the W estern sense.
W hat Haraw ay has in common with other theorists o f cyborgianism is the assertion o f the revision o f subjectivity that a hybrid body brings about, and by extension the revision o f the culture to nature relationship which sustains an oedipalized and appropriately zoned human body in its social functions. Haraway thus proposes, perhaps more explicitly than other theorists, a new anthropology o f the self. This entails nothing less than both revising myths o f origin and the history of culture in modernity.
Like Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari, Haraway (ironically it must be said) envisions a new, postoedipal subject. The upshot of her view is that the question o f the repressive nature o f gender relations will not be changed by a reconfiguration o f difference but by an eradication o f the question o f gender itself in the science fictional figure o f the cyborg.
C yb orgs, literature and theory
O bvious in all the cyborgian critical positions examined here is the twin assertion o f a changed subjectivity and a historico-cultural shift. For the cyborgians, contem porary culture is made up o f postoedipal or schizoid subjects in a postm odernist world.
Just as Freudian metapsychology w as seen as an explanatory discourse which underpinned a particular ideology and theory o f history (those o f capitalism and modernity) and perhaps even helped produce the subject o f and in the nonnative nuclear family, so cyborgianism sees itself as the representative theory o f a new order o f things.
That new order is troped by the cyborg subject, who is untroubled by the apparent or imminent obsolescence o f the human being, and rejoices in the transcending o f the compromise between culture and nature which the fragile human psyche and the "feeble animal organism" which is its body represent.
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Yet something remains troubling in the heralding o f this new order. A symptomatic tension is discernible between the critiques and the goals o f cyborgian theory.
The central critique o f cyborgianism is against the broadly psychoanalytic account o f the physical function o f the physical, fleshly body. The major alternatives to this position, as w e have seen, are the positing o f an ideologically "progressive" schizophrenia or the theoretical possibility o f a technologically produced body.
The theorizing o f both o f these positions depends crucially on literature, usually science fiction, as epistemological evidence. As Baudrillard (1983:128) puts it, as if marking the extremes o f his own field o f inquiry, "here w e are far from the living room and close to science fiction" . The use o f literature in this w ay is not o f course new, and it seems most significant that the very evidential field which psychoanalysis used in part to corroborate the postulate o f the Oedipus complex should be used in much the same w ay to corroborate the postulate o f a postoedipal subject. The important difference is the use to which that "evidence" is put.
W hile literature in classical psychoanalysis exemplified pathological states or metapsychological tenets, this w as useful only insofar as it functioned as an exemplary metaphor, which could then be unpacked in m etapsychological or clinical terms. Cyborgian theory, on the other hand, while it uses the figure o f the cyborg as just such an e x e m p la r m etaphor, wishes also to m ake o f science fiction a self-evident explanation o f a subjective or epistemic shift w hich has already happened, precisely when such literature is by definition about unrealized possibility. In other w ords, the explanatory force o f cyborgian theory must be doubted inasmuch as it makes psychological or anthropological claims for a postoedipal subject which has as yet only a rhetorical or metaphorical existence. The same problems arise for the essentially postm odernist assumption, m ade by all the cyborgian theorists review ed here, that political and epistemological claims or analyses can be made using fictional materials as evidence and/or corroboration.
W hat thus arises in the work o f these and lesser, more faddish thinkers, is an utopian confusion o f the distinction between an object and its representation(s). O f course, none o f these theorists presents an utopian view o f the current state o f technoculture, but all are utopian in the sense that they look to a future state o f more or less progressive postcapitalism and postoedipality. Yet all are com promised by their own discursive mode. As Foucault pointed out (1970) , modernity, the "era o f the ego" , operates through the imperative to confuse an object -the human being -with its representations -language. From within that double bind, the empirical-transcendental doublet o f modernity, humanity problem atizes its own existence. Thus the central question o f psychoanalysis, the "counter-science" o f modernity, is: how do we know ourselves? The question, thus, which really concerns cyborgianism is: if we create our machines in our image, how are they different from us? The two questions are not so far apart. When cyborgian theorists insist on a posthuman episteme, they do so, as Csiscery-Ronay (1991) points out, as science fiction authors. Which returns us to Ballard.
C onclusion
Thinking and writing about cyborgs and human subjectivity in contemporary information culture has proliferated enormously in the last few years. Yet few thinkers, if any, have moved forward in any radical way from the positions reviewed in the first part o f this essay -they have becom e more or less representative. W hat lies at the heart o f contemporary thinking about cyborgianism is essentially an unacknowledged, or symptomatic (in the sense of being an unrecognised sign) ambivalence about the status o f human beings. "W eak" versions o f the cyborgian theoretical conviction that the imbrication o f human and machine means the superceding o f humanity by a higher order o f hybrid cyborg are somewhat naively celebratory o f such a prospect. Those versions that are apocalyptic and gloomily millenial, like Baudrillard's, yet revel in the vindication for theory that the prospect o f a cyborg culture brings. But behind these manifestations lies the ontological problem o f how it is possible to think through one's own death, be it subjective or cultural. The cyborgian positing o f a posthuinan culture evades -or rather, elides -both the problem o f origin and the problem o f being. It is a posthuman postm odem ity that is paradoxically but tellingly teleological. To the extent that cyborgian theory can be seen as an example o f a projection onto technology o f our own ambivalences about our split subjectivity, it has lessons to learn from authors like Ballard who write science fiction as extrapolation rather than theory.
Ballard's intention, thus, is to portray a fictional world w here psychopathology is a game which plays out on a technological board, w here psychic extremity in the human mind and body is w hat produces the possibility o f technology, an interaction with it, and the imaginative transcendence o f its instrumentality. Finally, w e must think through the apocalyptic possibilities o f that relation before w e can safely declare ourselves obsolete, and replaced by cyborgs.
